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## **Post-Unification Korea and America's Place In It**

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Kongdan Oh Hassig

## **PREFACE**

This paper was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of the task entitled, "The Character of Post-Unification Korea and America's Place in It," for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Net Assessment). The project is intended to help Net Assessment formulate ideas about the character of post-unification Korea, ideas that can provide a basis for structuring US foreign policy for the region. The study does not try to forecast the character of a unified Korea, but rather highlight the important unification issues that Koreans are discussing today.

The author is deeply grateful to many sources in Tokyo and in Seoul who agreed to discuss Korean unification issues. Their thoughts are included in this report, mostly on a not-for-attribution basis. At IDA, the author is especially grateful to Mr. Mike Leonard, who read the final draft and provided constructive feedback; to Ms. Shelly Smith, who edited the paper; and to Ms. Leta Horine, who professionally typed the paper for publication. Outside IDA, the author wants to express appreciation to Dr. Ralph C. Hassig, who read earlier drafts and made many valuable suggestions. The author bears full responsibility for any errors of interpretation contained herein.

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## **SUMMARY**

Korean unification will inevitably change the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia. Planning for the change should commence now. This report summarizes interviews, documents, and press reports that illuminate Korean visions of a unified Korea, Korean strategies to achieve unification, and factors that will influence the unification process and the character of post-unification Korea.

### **I. VISIONS OF A UNIFIED KOREA**

#### **A. Political Unification**

South Korean assumptions about a unified government include the following beliefs:

- The divergent political views of the two Koreas will not disappear at the moment of unification.
- The persons in authority in the two pre-unification governments will not necessarily remain in power after unification.
- The form of government of the half of Korea that is stronger at the time of unification (presumably South Korea) may not be welcomed by the other side.

It is widely recognized that to achieve unification, South Korea must eliminate current weaknesses in its domestic political system:

- Remnants of authoritarian leadership
- Entrenched bureaucracy
- Personal politics
- Political regionalism
- Xenophobic nationalism

North Korea's long-standing goal of reunifying the two Koreas by force has been replaced by a demand for the formation of a Korean confederacy consisting of "one nation, one state, two systems and two governments." The official guideline for unification is enunciated in the three principles of "independence, peaceful reunification

and great national unity,” where the principle of independence includes demands that American forces be withdrawn from South Korea and the US-ROK security alliance be abrogated.

## **B. Economic Unification**

The cost of Korean unification is likely to be formidable, with estimates ranging from \$0.25 to \$3 trillion over a 10-year period. North Korea’s economy has crumbled and its infrastructure is degraded to the post-Korean War level.

Some South Korean economists advocate a two-stage approach to a unified free market economy. In the first years of unification, two separate economies would operate side by side. During this period, the South would provide substantial asset transfers to boost the North’s economy. In the second stage, a unified economy modeled on the South’s market economy would be created, with wealth (held predominantly in the South) taxed heavily in order to transfer capital to the North. Other economists advocate the early adoption of a European-style social market system promoting a community concept in the economy, with an emphasis on community welfare—a concept more familiar to the North Koreans.

Several economic problems are likely to be encountered during unification:

- How to persuade the South Koreans to transfer some of their wealth to the North
- How to teach capitalism to the North Koreans
- How to eliminate corruption in South Korean business
- How to settle South Korean claims to land ownership in the North

## **C. Cultural Unification**

In thinking about unification, South Koreans tend to focus on the political-economic obstacles to the exclusion of the less obvious and less easily definable social and cultural obstacles. For years the people in both Koreas have been taught to view each other (or at least each other’s governments) as enemies. In 1993, the ROK government instructed all public school teachers to replace the traditional “anti-North Korean education” with “unification education.” North Korea has yet to adopt a comparable educational campaign, although in the few weeks since the inter-Korean summit the North Korean press has muted its criticism of South Korea. The problems of cultural



integration between the two Germanys provide a warning of the cultural difficulties that may lie ahead for Koreans.

#### **D. National Security Posture of a Unified Korea**

South Korean President Kim favors the principle of *chingun wondong*, "friendship with close neighbors and alliance with a distant nation (the United States). A second principle is "no threat, no intimidation." A unified Korea will need a strong military held in a non-offensive posture, taking Japan as a model. Kim's no threat-no intimidation policy is consistent with the following popularly held assumptions in the ROK:

- The combined forces of the two Koreas (2 million out of a total population of 70 million) will be too large for a unified Korea.
- Korea must forgo the option of weapons of mass destruction, which would be viewed as a threat by neighboring states.
- Korea must acquire advanced conventional weapons to keep up with its neighbors.
- Korean nationalism must be kept in check.

The DPRK has consistently taken the position that there is little prospect of peace on the Korean peninsula until US troops are withdrawn from the ROK and the ROK-US security alliance is abrogated. The prevailing opinion among South Koreans is that US troops are still necessary to prevent a recurrence of North Korean aggression, and that during the transition to unification, US troops would provide security in case the unification process becomes chaotic. However, most Koreans expect that in the post-unification period there will be less need for a US military presence.

As for their relations with neighboring powers, many South Koreans believe that within 25 years China will become a superpower but not a military threat. Animosity between Japan and Korea has existed for centuries. Today, the older (pre-Korean War) generations of South Koreans continue to see Japan as a potential threat to Korea. Most North Koreans, indoctrinated with their government's propaganda, share this perception. The younger generations of South Koreans, along with the more educated segment of the population, are much more favorably disposed toward Japan. In terms of adopting close alliances, South Koreans debate the advantages of allying themselves with Japan or with China.

During the cold war, Russia was considered one of South Korea's arch enemies and one of North Korea's closest friends. After the Soviet Union normalized relations

with the ROK in 1990, Soviet-North Korean relations cooled, but 10 years later they are being repaired. Most South Koreans do not expect Russia to play an important role in Korean unification.

## **II. SOUTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION STRATEGY**

President Kim Dae-jung's unification strategy encompasses three principles:

- "not to tolerate armed provocation by North Korea"
- "not to attempt a takeover or absorption of North Korea"
- "to broaden reconciliation and cooperation"

The ROK cannot afford to pay the entire cost of unification. Consequently, in the short term the sunshine policy seeks cooperative engagement with the DPRK rather than unification. The success of this gradualist strategy rests on several assumptions:

- The Kim Jong Il regime in the North will accept reconciliation.
- The patient unification strategy will be able to weather changes in ROK public opinion, which is easily influenced by events such as the periodic DPRK military incursions into the ROK.
- Other nations will pursue their own engagement policies to improve North Korea's economic position and soften its regime.
- International financial institutions will help finance North Korean reconstruction.

## **III. FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE KOREAN UNIFICATION**

### **A. North Korean Factors**

Arguably the most important factors reside in the nature of the DPRK regime and society:

- The ruling elite, whose life and livelihood would be threatened by democracy
- The corrupt bureaucracy
- The masses, who have been taught that capitalism is evil but who will be tempted to emigrate to the more prosperous South
- The military, who hold a privileged place in North Korean society
- The crumbling infrastructure, which will be a drain on the South Korean economy

## **B. South Korean Factors**

South Koreans, not yet ready for unification, will face the following problems:

- As time passes, they have fewer ties to their compatriots in the North.
- If the economy does not continue its recovery from the 1997 financial crisis, there will be no money to pay for reunification.
- Some South Koreans may have to be compensated for property taken by the North.
- Currency conversion and wage rates will have to be negotiated.
- Justice for criminals in the North, including government officials, will be a prickly problem.

## **C. International Factors**

Unlike Germany, Korea before its division was not the perpetrator of an armed conflict, and neither of the Koreas is occupied by foreign troops. Thus Korean unification will depend primarily on the will and desire of the two Korean peoples. Nevertheless, the international climate and the willingness of other states to provide economic assistance to a reunifying Korea will influence the unification process. The major regional powers will play important roles:

- *The United States.* Koreans will desire a reduction or complete removal of US troops from the Korean peninsula; they will also need considerable financial assistance from the United States and from the international financial organizations that it influences.
- *China.* If the Chinese Communist Party remains in power, it may inspire the (North) Korean Workers' Party to hold out against unification. Also, regional conflict involving China may draw more US troops to the Korean peninsula.
- *Japan.* North Korea expects Japan to provide significant economic assistance as compensation for its colonialization.
- *Russia.* Russia does not appear to be in a position to render significant economic assistance or to significantly influence unification.

## **IV. CONCLUSION**

At the turn of the century, South Koreans remain too preoccupied with their own domestic problems to give sufficient thought to planning for unification. This is less a sign of fatalism than a consequence of limited institutional means to address such issues and limited resources to project the ROK's power beyond its borders. Continued US

assistance in terms of political and economic support can play an important facilitating role in creating a peaceful and stable environment in Northeast Asia during and after Korean unification.

## **I. INTRODUCTION: PREPARING FOR THE INEVITABLE**

At the turn of the century, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to function as an independent state although it has fallen on hard times. While the timing of reunification remains in doubt, the logic of politics, economics, and culture argues that Korea will some day be reunited. In the 1990s the United States focused on the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs as a threat to regional and global nonproliferation. Faced with the immediate challenge of dealing with an unpredictable, heavily armed, trouble-making North Korea, neither the ROK nor the United States has given much thought to the character of a unified Korea.

This paper offers various views on what a unified Korea might look like, based on interviews with South Korean policy makers and readings of published materials. The discussion is organized around three themes. First, *visions of a unified Korea* are presented, including form of government, type of economy, degree of cultural and political homogeneity, alliance status, national security posture, and relations with neighboring states and the United States.

Second, *strategies to achieve unification* are considered. In the 1990s, successive South Korean governments have announced grand unification goals, only to fall short in terms of implementing the necessary strategies to achieve these goals. In North Korea, the gap between goals and reality is even more striking.

Third, *factors that may influence post-unification Korea* are considered, including domestic factors such as economic health, and international factors such as the foreign policies of the other powers in the region. Of particular concern is the role the United States will play in a post-unification environment.

## **II. VISIONS OF A UNIFIED KOREA**

### **A. Form of Government**

#### **1. South Korea's Views: Democracy and Capitalism with a Conscience**

Except for two brief intervals in the early 1970s and early 1990s when delegates from the two Koreas met to discuss reconciliation, ROK administrations gave only lip service to reunification matters. ROK President Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1987) suggested that the form of a reunified Korea be decided by a Council of National Unification composed of representatives from the two Koreas. President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993),

believed that a unified Korea should be democratic, but he did not specify a more particular form of government. President Kim Young Sam (1993–1998), the first president to take office after the end of the Cold War, began his tenure with high hopes of making a breakthrough in dialogue with North Korea but soon became embittered by Pyongyang's unrelenting hostility toward the ROK in general and himself in particular. Like Roh, Kim only outlined the basic principles of a unified Korean government (supporting free and democratic values), without specifying a form.

The ROK's current president, Kim Dae-jung, views the DPRK's serious decline as an opportunity to advance unification interests. Even before becoming president, Kim had formulated and frequently spoken about his vision of a unified Korea. Since taking office in 1998, he has systematized his views, especially on the strategy of achieving unification.

President Kim's vision of a unified Korea includes five characteristics:<sup>1</sup>

- a democratically elected government
- a market economy
- an expanded social welfare system
- a foreign peace-making policy
- a strong defense

## **2. Challenges of Political Unification: Reform and Integration**

Several assumptions about a unified government are widespread in South Korea:<sup>2</sup>

- The extremely divergent political views of the two Koreas (socialist proletariat dictatorial system versus plural democratic open society) will not disappear at the moment of unification and will somehow have to be resolved in the early stages of unification.
- The persons in authority in the two pre-unification governments will not necessarily remain in power after unification—this is especially the case in the North, where political office is based primarily on loyalty to the Kim Jong Il

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<sup>1</sup> Kim Dae-jung, Kim Dae-jung's "Three-Stage" Approach to Korean Reunification (Los Angeles, California: University of Southern California, 1997), pp. 26–28.

<sup>2</sup> Kang Chung-ku, "Minjokkwa Tongil" [One Race and Unification], in Hanbando Tongil Kukka Cheje Kusang [Consideration of the System of a Unified Nation]: A special collection of research papers and debates to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Korean liberation, co-sponsored by Hangyore Sinmun [One Nation Newspaper] and the Coalition of Academic Associations of ROK. (Seoul: Hangyore Sinmun, 1995) (Special Collection), pp. 25–75.

regime. A massive shift in government personnel will prove to be a serious challenge to a unified government.

- The form of government of the half of Korea that is stronger at the time of unification (presumably South Korea) may not be welcomed by the other side, complicating the task of governing a unified Korea.

It is widely recognized that in order to achieve unification, the two Koreas must overcome several domestic obstacles posed by weaknesses in their political systems.<sup>3</sup>

*False Democracy.* The unified government should be a "true" democracy, contrasted with the quasi-democratic governments in the ROK up to the inauguration of the first civilian-led government (of Kim Young Sam) in 1993. Most South Koreans would agree that even under Kim Dae-jung, democracy in Korea falls short of the form it takes in more Westernized countries such as the United States. A marked impediment of government in the ROK is the often blatant profit-seeking of politicians. (Corruption investigations are commonplace.)

*Entrenched Bureaucracy.* Another shortcoming of the ROK political system is the entrenched interests of the bureaucracy, which is often unresponsive to the interests of the public and even elected officials. Korea is a bureaucratic meritocracy like Japan. Since the dynastic period, the best and brightest have entered government service through some form of examination system (in modern times, by way of the most prestigious universities). This level of professional competence gives the bureaucracies of the government (and the large conglomerates) considerable political clout. In a unified Korea the problem of bureaucracies will be doubled as two governments merge.

*Personal Politics.* Politics in Korea is shaped by individual politicians who organize and control their own parties. Although North Korea has taken this vice to the extreme with the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il personality cult, it is also the case in South Korea that political campaigns are centered on an individual and his party. In the early days of a unified Korea, chaotic conditions may need to be addressed by a firm governing hand, presenting the danger that both Koreas faced following liberation, when autocrats took control of the governments in the North and the South.

*Political Regionalism.* Another weakness of ROK politics is its excessive regionalism. Until the election of Kim Dae-jung, South Korean presidents came from the

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<sup>3</sup> Paek Un-sun, "Tongil Kukka Chongbu Chegye" [The Government Structure of a Unified Nation], Special Collection, pp. 124-148. Also, interviews conducted by the author in Seoul, October 13-19, 1999.

two south-central Kyungsang provinces, and the government and large business were mostly run by people from these provinces. Kim Dae-jung, coming from the formerly discriminated Cholla provinces, brought into power many people from that region. In North Korea, even under the firm control of Kim Jong Il and the Korean Workers' Party, there lingers a strong remnant of the traditional east-west regionalism.

*Xenophobic Nationalism.* Xenophobic nationalism continues to exist in the ROK, as illustrated by responses of many Koreans to the terms of the International Monetary Fund bailout of Korea's economy in late 1997. Fifty years of isolation and government propaganda have created an even greater xenophobia in the North. Most South Koreans today realize that they must shed this nationalism—at least the economic and political aspects of it—if they are to survive in the international community. One of the central themes of the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–1998) was the globalization (*segzewha*) of Korea, but this campaign was only partially successful. The North Korean government, which touts its “socialism in our own style” even to the extent of adopting its own calendar, is opposed to globalization.

### **3. North Korea's Views on Unification: Separate but Equal**

In the 1990s North Korea's long-standing goal of reunifying the two Koreas by force changed to a demand for the formation of a Korean confederacy consisting of “one nation, one state, two systems and two governments”—a strange political arrangement indeed, but one that would presumably guarantee the survival of the North Korean government. North Korea's unification policy has remained consistent since President Kim's death. In his first major paper on unification and foreign policy, President Kim's successor, his son Kim Jong Il, pledged to continue his father's policies embodied in the Three Charters for the Reunification of the Fatherland, which are the Three Principles of “independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity,” the Ten Point Guideline for All-Korean Unity, and Kim Il Sung's proposal for the formation of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK). The Three Principles were agreed to in the 1972 North-South joint communiqué, although the two Koreas interpret them differently. By the principle of independence, North Korea means that American forces must be withdrawn from South Korea and the US-ROK security alliance abrogated.

Given the Kim Jong Il regime's continued adherence to totalitarian socialism, it is fair to assume that the North Korean vision of a unified Korea is one in which socialism guided by the (North) Korean Workers' Party prevails. To achieve this goal, the DPRK seeks to gain diplomatic and economic parity with the ROK and then employ united front



tactics to undermine the South Korean government, in preparation for a Communist takeover. Although this vision is unlikely to be realized, North Korea's unification posture must be counted as one of the influencing factors in the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula.

## **B. Type of Economy**

The cost of Korean unification is likely to be formidable, with estimates ranging from \$0.25 trillion to as high as \$3.6 trillion over a 10-year reconciliation period.<sup>4</sup> North Korea's economy has crumbled, with factory operating rates at around 25 percent and an infrastructure degraded to the post-Korean War level.

### **1. South Korea's Views: Social Market or Transition to Free Market**

One school of thought in the ROK advocates a two-stage approach to a unified free market economy. In the first years of unification, two separate economies would operate side by side: the market economy in the South and the socialist economy in the North. During this period, the ROK would provide substantial asset transfers to boost the North's economy. In the second stage, a unified economy modeled on the South's market economy would be created, but wealth (held predominantly in the South) would be taxed heavily in order to transfer capital to the North, with the expectation that when the North's economy becomes strong, all Koreans would benefit.<sup>5</sup>

A second school of thought advocates the early adoption of a German- or Scandinavian-style "social market system," with an emphasis on community welfare—a concept more familiar to the North Koreans. Legal mechanisms would be enacted to spread the wealth more equally throughout society to narrow the gap between rich and poor.<sup>6</sup> This school appears to be gaining adherents in the ROK, especially in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, which exposed serious inequities in South Korean

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<sup>4</sup> The \$0.25 trillion estimate is from Daewoo Securities, which expects a 50/50 allocation of funds between business investment and social overhead capital. See Yonhap news service, April 10, 2000. The multi-trillion dollar figure is from Goldman Sachs, which predicts costs of between \$770 billion and \$3.55 trillion, depending on current productivity of the North's economy relative to the South's. See Yonhap news service, April 21, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Kim Dae-hwan, "Tongil Kyungje Chejewa Kukkaui Yokhal" [A Unified Economic System and the Role of the Government in a Unified Nation], Special Collection, pp. 313–344. Also, Lee Young-sun, "Tongil Ottoke Chunbi Haeyahana?" [Unification: How Do We Prepare?], in Lee Young-sun, ed., *Tongil Chunbi [Unification Preparation]: Research Monograph Number 3*, Institute for Unification Research, Yonsei University (Seoul: Orum Publisher, 1997), pp. 9–22.

<sup>6</sup> Chang Won-suk, "Tongil Ifuui Sahoe Kyungje Cheje: Urisik Sahoejok Sijnag Kyungjeui Hanau Siron" [Social Market System in the post-Unification: An Attempt to Build Our Own Social Market Economic System], *Kyungje Nonjip*, [Economic Thesis], Number 50, 1993. Also, Kim Dae-hwan, pp. 316–317.

society and highlighted inefficiencies and corruption in South Korean business. The crisis imposed heavy economic and social hardships on a large segment of the South Korean population, and the government offered little assistance, such as unemployment compensation, to those affected. Most South Korean economists recommend that a unified Korea follow the pattern of the capitalist economy in the South, with the addition of a social welfare component.

## **2. Challenges of Economic Unification: Reform and Integration**

The most obvious problem posed by any unification scheme is that the richer South Koreans will have to be persuaded to set aside their self-interest in the short term to help the North Koreans, who under their communist government have wasted a half century of economic resources in the pursuit of a utopian illusion.

A second problem is how to bring the North Korean people, who have been taught to hate and fear capitalism, into a market economy. True, the economic collapse in the North has forced most people to rely on black market operations in order to survive, and the cadres are adept at using market mechanisms to enrich themselves outside of the socialist system, but few North Koreans have any experience working for large foreign- or South Korean-owned private companies. To them, such ownership smacks of imperialism.

A third problem is that the concept of social welfare and business accountability will have to be accepted in the ROK—especially in terms of greater operating transparency and stricter adherence to laws and regulations.<sup>7</sup>

A fourth problem concerns the issue of land ownership. Korea is a heavily populated peninsula. Private land ownership in the South is limited to the relatively wealthy; in the North, it is outlawed. The land ownership problems that a united Germany encountered (with West Germans claiming land taken from them by the communists) provide an indication of the importance that the land problem will have in the early years of a unified Korea.

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<sup>7</sup> Choe Kyung-ku, *Chohapjuui Pokchi Kukka* [Social Corporatism and Welfare State] (Seoul: Hannarae, 1993).

Four principles have been offered for solving the land ownership problem in a unified Korea:<sup>8</sup>

- privatize North Korean land (in a manner not yet specified)
- limit land ownership by the wealthy and powerful, perhaps by requiring that land owners live on their land
- strengthen laws protecting renters
- strengthen local autonomy and promote local development so that local communities can monitor land use.

The challenge of fairly allocating land and promoting local autonomy is part of a broader challenge of a unified Korea: to develop local and regional infrastructure such as schools, communication networks, parks and performance centers, thereby making life outside of the largest cities more pleasant and attractive while also enhancing the political awareness of the rural population.

### **C. Cultural and Political Homogeneity**

#### **1. Korean Homogeneity: The Myth**

Can Koreans realize the vision of achieving a culturally and politically unified nation? The tendency among South Koreans who think about unification is to focus on political-economic obstacles to unification to the exclusion of the less obvious and less easily definable social and cultural obstacles. The German unification experience shows that, along with severe economic challenges, the problem of the “wall in the head” can poison relations between citizens of a divided nation. A similar “DMZ in the head” will surely hinder Korean unification. The ostracism that many North Korean defectors to the South experience is early testimony to this problem.

Koreans are proud of the fact that they have been a relatively homogeneous culture for thousands of years. But Koreans in the North and the South have been divided for over 50 years, and during that period North Koreans have been largely cut off from outside influences. Few North Koreans realize how much South Korea has changed since 1945.

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<sup>8</sup> Hwang Han-sik, “Tongil Kukkaui Toji Munjewa Soyu Iyong System” [Land Issue of a Unified Nation and the System of Ownership and Lease], Special Collection, pp. 345–372. Also, interviews in Seoul, October 13–19, 1999.

## **2. Inter-Korean Prejudices: The Need for Information**

For years, the people in the North and South have been taught to view each other (or at least each other's governments) as enemies. In 1993, the ROK government instructed all public school teachers to replace "anti-North Korean education" with "unification education." In 1998, a ROK survey revealed that a majority of students (especially male students) still considered the North Koreans to be their enemy. One middle school teacher (whose experience has been publicized by the Ministry of Unification) decided to experiment with a new unification curriculum.<sup>9</sup> For 8 weeks, in place of her usual lectures on unification, the teacher showed students videos made by visitors to North Korea, and presented information gleaned from defectors and news reports. Student attitudes toward North Korea markedly improved after this exposure to North Korean news, leading the teacher to conclude that providing students with information and allowing them to learn for themselves is more effective in eliminating prejudice than delivering anti-prejudice lectures.

### **D. National Security Posture**

#### **1. Basic Principle: No Threat, No Intimidation**

President Kim Dae-jung favors the principle of *chingun wondong*, "friendship with close neighbors and alliance with a distant nation."<sup>10</sup> Such an arrangement would leave Korea free to establish relationships with all of its neighbors, while providing Korea with a security lifeline if regional relationships turned sour. A second principle is "no threat-no intimidation." A unified Korea will need a strong military held in a non-offensive posture, taking Japan as a model. The obvious problem with this approach is that since most defensive weapons can be used for offense, a well-defended Korea may pose a threat to its neighbors.

Kim's no threat-no-intimidation goal policy is consistent with the following popularly held assumptions in the ROK:<sup>11</sup>

- China will become an economic but not a military superpower.
- Japan will never adopt nuclear or biochemical weapons.

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<sup>9</sup> Lee Mi-suk, "Hyunjang Pogoso" [On-the-spot Report], in *Tongil Hanguk* [Unified Korea], December 1999, pp. 71-73.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Minister of Unification Dong-won Lim, Seoul, October 14, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews and focus group discussions in Seoul, October 13-19, 1999.

- The combined forces of the two Koreas (2 million out of a total population of 70 million) will be too large for a unified Korea.
- Korea must forgo the option of weapons of mass destruction, which would be viewed as a threat by neighboring states.
- Korea must acquire conventional weapons comparable to the weapons of its neighbors.
- Korean nationalism must be kept in check.

## **2. Alliance Status of a Unified Korea: From Military to Political Alliance**

The DPRK has consistently taken the position that there will be no prospect of peace on the Korean peninsula until US troops are withdrawn from the ROK and the ROK-US security alliance is abrogated.

The prevailing opinion among South Koreans, except for a radical student fringe element, is that US troops are still necessary to prevent a recurrence of North Korean aggression, and that during the transition to unification, the continued presence of US troops would provide security in case the unification process turns chaotic or a faction in the North Korean military makes a power play. Most Koreans, however, expect that the need for a US military presence will diminish in the post-unification period.

The nature of the US-Korea relationship will be strongly influenced by the security situation in Northeast Asia. For example, if the United States pursues a constructive relationship with China, and the US-Japan relationship remains solid, Korea may desire only a political relationship with the United States, not a military alliance. If, on the other hand, the US-China relationship becomes hostile (e.g., over the issue of Taiwan) or if Japan and China should become involved in some altercation, Koreans may well desire a strong US-ROK security relationship. What seems highly likely, however, is that unless actual conflict breaks out in the region, Koreans will be almost unanimous in demanding that US troops leave Korea.

## **3. The Korea-China Relationship: China as a Benign Power**

For most of recorded history, Koreans have viewed China as the center of the civilized world. Although the Korean spoken language is derived from the Altaic rather than the Chinese, until the invention of the Korean alphabet in the 15th century Koreans wrote with Chinese characters. Even after the advent of the Korean writing system, Chinese writing continued to be used as a supplementary system integrated into the Korean system (although this practice has been discontinued in the DPRK). Korean

Buddhist and Confucian cultures likewise come from China, as does much of Korean material culture. Thus Koreans have a strong affinity to the Chinese.

Many Koreans share the following assumptions about the future of the Korea-China relationship:<sup>12</sup>

- In the early years of this century, China will become a major power; within 25 years, it will be a superpower.
- China will be a benign power, not a military threat to Korea.
- Even if the Chinese Communist Party remains in power, China will over the next 15 years democratize its government.
- China will make a concerted effort to bring Korea into its orbit, primarily as a counterweight against US hegemony and Japanese power.
- As China develops, it will become economically more important to Korea.
- China will be a moderately constructive participant in international affairs.

South Koreans still feel culturally close to the Chinese. As for the North Koreans, despite the fact that they have tried to maintain an equidistant relationship between China and Russia, China has been the more reliable ally, saving North Korea in the Korean War and continuing to provide economic assistance to North Korea after the demise of the Soviet Union.

#### **4. The Korea-Japan Relationship: A Logical and Technological Partnership**

Animosity between Japan and Korea has existed for centuries, long before the harsh Japanese colonization of Korea in the 20th century. Today, the older pre-Korean War generations of South Koreans continue to view Japan as a potential threat to Korea. Most North Koreans, indoctrinated with their government's propaganda, share this perception. The younger generations of South Koreans, along with the more educated segment of the population, are much more favorably disposed toward Japan, which they see as a source of advanced technology and attractive consumer goods. This warming

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<sup>12</sup> Interviews and focus group discussions in Tokyo and Seoul, October 10–19, 1999. Also, Taeho Kim and Byungki Kim, "The Military's New Role in a Changing China and Russia: Implications for Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula." A paper presented at the annual conference co-hosted by The Council on US-Korean Security Studies and The Research Institute on National Security Affairs, Seoul, November 4–7, 1998, pp. 1–29. And Kim Yu-nam, *Tugaeui Hangukkwa Chybyunguktul* [The Two Koreas and Their Neighbors]. (Seoul: HunMinJongUm Publishing co. 1996), pp. 294–296.

trend suggests that, barring problems posed by the former North Korean population of a unified Korea, the future of the Korea-Japan relationship is bright.<sup>13</sup>

In South Korea, assumptions about the Korea-Japan relationship include the following:

- The two countries will develop an amicable relationship.
- A unified Korea will become a strong economic competitor of Japan in many fields.
- Korean popular culture will become as popular as imported Japanese popular culture.
- Korea and Japan will be able to cooperate in dealing with issues involving the environment and the open seas.
- The Japanese will gain greater respect for Koreans, but many will view a larger and stronger Korea as a threat.

In South Korea debate is growing over whether a unified Korea should ally itself closer with Japan or China. The argument for a closer relationship with Japan is that the Japanese share the same democratic and market economy values as Koreans, and Japan is a valuable source of technology and investment. The argument for a closer relationship with China is that in the 19th and 20th century China has not threatened Korea, and Korean culture is derived largely from China. An interesting observation from a professor of political science at a Korean university is that at the beginning of his course on international relations, students tend to favor a closer relationship with China, following their cultural sentiments. By the end of the course, having learned how to think strategically, they tend to favor a closer relationship with Japan. (The actual ranking of desired relationships changes from US/China/Japan/Russia to US/Japan/China/Russia.)<sup>14</sup>

### **5. The Korea-Russia Relationship: Big Country, Small Role**

As the leader of the Cold War Communist bloc, Russia was considered one of South Korea's arch enemies, and one of North Korea's closest friends. In 1990 the ROK established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union, in the process extending several billion dollars in loans. Over the course of the following years, the business

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<sup>13</sup> Interviews in Tokyo and Seoul, October 10–19, 1999. Also, Kongdan Oh, *Korea's Foreign Policy: A Dolphin among Whales?* A paper presented at the annual conference of the Council on US–Korean Security Studies, Arlington, Virginia, October 27–30, 1999, pp. 1–19.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Prof. Kim Woo-sang, Professor in Political Science and International Relations, October 18, 1999).

relationship failed to materialize as expected, due primarily to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and only some of the promised ROK loans were ever made. The Russians, having lost political leverage in North Korea after their tilt toward the South, and failing to establish a profitable trading and investment relationship with the South Koreans, have been disappointed with their Korean foreign policy. In the latter years of the 1990s, however, they began to repair relations with North Korea. The tilt toward South Korea remains, with the ROK accepting some Soviet weapons in lieu of Russian loan repayments, and welcoming a visit from a high-level Russian military delegation in 1999.

Many South Koreans share the following assumptions about the future of the Korea-Russia relationship:

- It will take many years for the Russians to build a true democratic society.
- In the meantime the larger part of Russia's energy will be devoted to its domestic agenda.
- Consequently, Russia will play a relatively small economic and political role in Korea's affairs in the foreseeable future
- Russia's vast mineral resources provide an obvious complement to Korea's technology-intensive but resource poor economy.

### **III. STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF A UNIFIED KOREA**

#### **A. Review of ROK Unification Goals**

To review, under President Kim Dae-jung, the ROK seeks strategies to achieve the following unification goals

- A more democratic government than the ROK has had in the past
- A market economy with a Western-style (American or European) social welfare program; greater transparency in business; limitations on large corporations; an end to government-business ties
- A culture of one people, open to international influences, with reduced nationalism and domestic regionalism
- A security posture strong enough to discourage attack but not threatening Korea's neighbors; a possible downgrading of the US-Korea security alliance to the political level after unification has been successfully completed



- A foreign relations policy that may tip toward either Japan or China, with the United States still the closest partner, and Russia the least important of Korea's neighbors<sup>15</sup>

The ROK is well on its way to achieving its domestic goals, but its unification goals diverge markedly from those of the DPRK, which seeks above all to preserve the power of its ruling regime.

## **B. ROK Unification Policy: Kim Dae-Jung's Engagement Strategy**

President Kim Dae-jung unveiled his engagement strategy in the first days of his administration in early 1998. The strategy is designed to change North Korea's policies over the long term by offering aid and cooperation without requiring short-term policy changes in return.

Initially called the "sunshine policy" after the Aesop fable, and later the Comprehensive Engagement Policy, ROK engagement is based on three principles:

- "not to tolerate armed provocation by North Korea"
- "not to attempt a takeover or absorption of North Korea"
- "to broaden reconciliation and cooperation"

Guidelines for implementing the sunshine policy include:

- separating politics from business approaches to the North
- pursuing engagement at a pace consistent with popular consensus
- encouraging the international community—especially the United States and Japan—to pursue their own engagement policies toward the DPRK

The ROK government recognizes that it cannot afford to pay the entire cost of unification. Consequently, in the short term the sunshine policy seeks cooperative engagement with the DPRK rather than unification, which the ROK foreign minister has suggested might not be achieved for a quarter of a century.<sup>16</sup> This strategy aims to achieve many of the benefits of unification without the cost imposed by taking full responsibility for unification. Initially, people-to-people exchanges and economic cooperation would achieve "visitation rights" for divided families and lower tensions. As inter-Korean trust is built up, the economic benefits of lower military expenditures and

<sup>15</sup> Interviews with ROK cabinet members, core members of the National Security Council of ROK, Seoul, October 13–19, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> The statement by Minister Hong Soon-young was reported by the ROK's official Yonhap News Agency, January 3, 2000.

greater economic cooperation would be realized. During this period, the North Korean economy would be strengthened (largely through the efforts of foreign investors), reducing the eventual cost of unification to the ROK government. Finally, a unification of political systems would be accomplished.

The success of this gradualist strategy rests on several assumptions:

- The Kim Jong Il regime in the North will accept reconciliation.
- The strategy can weather changes in ROK public opinion, which is easily influenced by such events as the periodic DPRK military incursions into the ROK.
- Wealthier nations will pursue their own engagement policies to improve North Korea's economic position and soften its regime.
- International financial institutions will help finance North Korean reconstruction.

During the first 2 years of Kim Dae-jung's administration, the public has generally supported the sunshine policy (support ratings in the 50 to 60 percent range), despite several North Korean military incursions and political rebuffs.<sup>17</sup> Support in the face of North Korean provocations may be based in part on the Korean political trait of following the leader, in this case Kim Dae-jung.<sup>18</sup> Except for the opposition political party and one or two conservative opposition newspapers (including the powerful *Chosun Ilbo*), virtually no one has criticized the sunshine policy. Members of the academic and policy community have either supported the policy or remained silent.

### C. Implementation of the ROK Unification Strategy

Kim Dae-jung has vigorously lobbied for his sunshine policy, traveling to foreign countries to ask them to adopt their own engagement policies toward North Korea. The Kim government has also trumpeted the early successes of the sunshine policy, such as an

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<sup>17</sup> See, for example, the following published polling results: In a February 1999 poll, 54.2 percent supported President Kim's engagement, according to a poll by the ROK newspaper *Hangyore*, published on February 28, 1999. A poll in September 1999 by the newspaper *Chungang Ilbo*, reported on September 21, 1999, found a support rate of 56.6 percent. In December, a Korea Research Center Poll conducted at the request of the Ministry of Unification found 65.5 percent supporting the engagement policy, according to a Yonhap News Agency report of December 27, 1999, written by Chang Yong-hun.

<sup>18</sup> The follow-the-leader observation is made by Rinn-Sup Shinn, *South Korea: "Sunshine Policy" and Its Political Context*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Updated May 27, 1999, p. 22.

increased number of tourist visits to the DPRK, increased business contacts, and the fact that the two countries have remained at peace.

To date, the crowning achievement of Kim's sunshine policy is the first-ever inter-Korean summit meeting, held in Pyongyang from June 13–15, 2000. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il initialed a South-North Joint Declaration in which they agreed to achieve unification "independently" (traditionally a DPRK code word for expelling US forces from the ROK), to permit exchange visits of separated families (200 are scheduled to meet in August 2000), and to engage in economic cooperation and social, cultural and sports exchanges.<sup>19</sup> Whether this agreement will be implemented more successfully than similar agreements in 1972 and 1991 remains to be seen.

### **1. Economic Measures: Promoting Private Investment**

The Kim Dae-jung government has actively encouraged South Korean companies to invest in North Korea, although all large investments are subject to government approval. The adoption of the sunshine policy enabled the founder of the Hyundai conglomerate, Chung Ju-yung, to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a joint tourism project with North Korea. Hyundai has made plans for other investments as well. There is speculation that the Kim Dae-jung government may be providing financial incentives to Hyundai, or at least offering guarantees against risk, in order to use Hyundai as a front organization to deal with the North Korean regime, which is reluctant to extend legitimacy to the southern government by dealing with its officials. The ROK government has also provided food and fertilizer aid to the DPRK since 1996.

To prepare for unification, the Ministry of Unification has promulgated a series of laws. The first law, passed in August 1990, established a "South-North Cooperation Fund Law." The money for this Ministry of Unification fund comes from long-term loans, endowments from international and domestic Korean foundations, interest accumulated from fund investments, and a special endowment from the office of the ROK president. The Minister of Unification supervises the investment and financing of the fund in close consultation with the Ministry of Finance and Economy.<sup>20</sup> How the fund is to be further augmented is a topic of debate in the ROK.

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<sup>19</sup> Yonhap news service report, June 14, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> Tongil Paekso [Unification White Paper] 1995 (Seoul: Ministry of National Unification, December 1995), pp. 544–567.

## **2. Domestic Political Measures: Relaxing Censorship**

For years the ROK's National Security Law prevented the South Korean people from learning about North Korea or voicing opinions that favor the North Korean government. The DPRK government has warned that unless this law is abolished and the National Intelligence Service (which enforces the law) is disbanded, there is no possibility of Korean reconciliation. In the 1990s this law was gradually relaxed. By the turn of the century South Koreans were permitted to talk about positive aspects of North Korea and study its socialist system. North Korean satellite television (from a Thai satellite) can be recorded by South Korean television stations for subsequent rebroadcast.

The government has encouraged private organizations, most notably the Hyundai companies, to sponsor ROK-DPRK sports contests and exchanges. Cultural programs are also promoted with the ROK government's blessing. For example, in 1999, a troupe of South Koreans accompanied by President Clinton's brother Roger Clinton performed at a musical event in Pyongyang.

## **3. Security Measures: Maintaining a Strong Defense**

The first principle of the sunshine policy is to counter North Korean provocations. When North Korean patrol boats fired on South Korean patrol boats in ROK-controlled waters in the West Sea in June 1999, the better armed South Korean boats sank one of the North's boats and damaged several others, ending the challenge at least for the time being. The ROK military has continued to upgrade its forces, conduct military exercises (sometimes jointly with the United States), and participate in trilateral security talks with the United States and Japan to discuss preparations for contingencies on the Korean peninsula. But the largest of the joint ROK-US military exercises, Team Spirit, has been discontinued since 1994. The ROK has also worked to improve its relations with China, hoping that the Chinese will restrain North Korean military adventurism.

## **4. Educational Measures: In the Planning Stage**

Plans for improving inter-Korean relations through education are still in their initial stages. Special teacher training programs, revisions of government-mandated textbooks, and curriculum changes are being debated.

## **D. Growing Private Sector Interest in Unification**

As prospects for Korean reconciliation, if not unification, brighten, the ROK business sector has become more interested in North Korea, especially since the summit

meeting. Underlying motivations are national and company competitiveness. Koreans fear that the Japanese, with their larger bankrolls and more advanced technology, will move into the DPRK before South Korean companies. And among South Korean companies, there is the fear that a competitor will be the first to establish exclusive business rights in North Korea, as Hyundai has done in North Korea's scenic Kumgang region. In-house economic, management, and strategic planning think tanks at large South Korean companies are now asking researchers and staff members to study unified Korea from the standpoints of energy resources, property ownership, marketing, the environment, management, tax advantages, and employment practices and vocational training.

#### **E. Concluding Comments on Strategies for Unification**

Koreans are not known for long-term strategic thinking, especially in international affairs. As inhabitants of a relatively small, secluded country guided by a hierarchical Confucian tradition, Koreans have been more concerned about maintaining the status quo than looking into the future for opportunities. As a victim of larger countries—Japan in the first half of the 20th century and the Cold War powers in the second half—Koreans have been more reactive than active. Facing the momentous challenge of reunifying their country and taking their place as an independent force in Asia, they have hesitated to make bold plans. ROK foreign policy has been largely guided by the United States. But at the turn of the century the South Korean press has begun to call for Koreans to take the initiative in making North Korea policy.

Strategies for unification are underdeveloped in South Korea for other reasons as well. The educational system until recently has not taught strategic thinking. Many of the South Koreans trained to think strategically received their training in recent years in the United States. Among politicians, the overriding concern has been domestic power politics.

The first steps in planning for unification have just begun. An even greater challenge will be to incorporate into these plans the many domestic and foreign variables that may influence the course of unification.

#### **IV. FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE KOREAN UNIFICATION**

Most of the factors with the potential to influence the course of Korean unification and shape a unified Korea have already been mentioned in this paper. In this concluding

section they are explicitly listed as variables to be considered in designing and implementing strategies for unification.

#### **A. North Korean Factors**

*The Ruling Elite.* Arguably the most important factors reside in the nature of the DPRK regime and society. Fearing unification under a democratic government, North Korean authorities have vowed to block it at all costs, insisting on their own form of unification, which in fact is a confederation of two separate governments and social systems. This opposition on the part of the Kim Jong Il regime is likely to raise obstacles even after the unification process has begun, especially if the North Korean leadership remains intact during the process. But this prediction begs the question of what would trigger unification. Would it come after a collapse of North Korean society into ungovernable chaos, somewhat like the East German case? Would it follow another Korean War? Or would it be ushered in by a post-Kim Jong Il regime, which, in return for good treatment by the South Koreans, agrees to negotiate an orderly unification? The most likely scenario is one in which North Korean society simply collapses, with top North Korean officials fleeing the country.

*The Bureaucrats.* A second factor is how well the North Korean bureaucrats will cooperate with South Korean authorities in implementing the unification process. Bureaucratic inertia can be very strong, as President Kim Dae-jung discovered when, as Korea's first opposition president, he tried to get the ROK bureaucracy he inherited from the government party to implement his new policies.

*The Masses.* The North Korean masses are taught from cradle to grave that the ROK government is an exploiting government under the control of the Americans. They have been taught that capitalism is evil. Will their prejudices block South Korean initiatives at every step of the way? Will they have the ability to participate in a democratic market-oriented society?

*The Military.* Under Kim Jong Il, the military has been given an even more privileged role in North Korean society than it had under his father. The military controls all the best economic resources. With one out of every 20 North Koreans in uniform, the military has the potential to seriously disrupt unification.

*Infrastructure.* The North Korean infrastructure is in ruins. How quickly it can be rebuilt will influence how easily economic unification can be achieved, and how quickly the North Koreans' standard of living is improved.

*The Emigration Problem.* Given the gap between living standards in the two Koreas, unification will open the way for millions of North Koreans to move to the already-crowded South in search of employment and welfare. How this problem is handled in terms of providing assistance and jobs to Koreans who remain in the North, rebuilding their economy, or blocking them from entering South Korea will be one of the more important factors in guiding unification.

*Pre-Unification Provocations from the North.* About once a year the DPRK military stages some provocation against the ROK, often in the form of a spy boat or naval patrol boat intrusion. After each incident, South Korean public opinion turns against the North. If these provocations continue, South Koreans may become more prejudiced against North Koreans and less willing to provide them with economic assistance, both before and after unification.

## **B. South Korean Factors**

*Timing.* Koreans in the North and South have longed for unification, both to unite and strengthen their country and to unite divided families. As time passes, members of immediate families divided during the Korean War die, leaving only more distant relatives, whose motivation for reuniting with their families is weaker. If unification should be delayed for another 25 years, Koreans on the two sides of the demilitarized zone may become strangers, increasing the difficulty of unification.

*Economy.* The high cost of unification will have to be borne primarily by South Koreans. Under any circumstance it will be difficult to convince many South Koreans to pay higher taxes or voluntarily contribute to the welfare of North Koreans. If the South Korean economy is unhealthy at the time of unification, the problem of wealth transfer will be magnified.

*Reclaiming Lost Property.* German unification demonstrates the trouble caused by owners trying to reclaim land taken years before by the communist authorities.

*Currency Conversion and Wages.* The economic health of the economy in the North and the personal welfare of the North Korean people will be strongly influenced by how the virtually worthless North Korean won is converted to the South Korean won. German advisors on Korean unification have cautioned against making the conversion too generous to the North Korean people, but this policy obviously carries its own risks of disrupting unification.

*Justice for Criminals in the North.* Tens or hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have been imprisoned for objecting to or slandering the regimes of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong Il. These political prisoners must be separated from common criminals and quickly released. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of North Korean officials, beginning with Kim Jong Il, could be charged with crimes against their people. How they are dealt with will influence the course of unification.

### **C. International Factors**

Korea, before its division, unlike Germany, was not the perpetrator of an armed conflict, and neither of the Koreas is occupied by foreign troops (despite North Korea's assertions of American colonialism). Thus, Korean unification will depend primarily on the will and desire of the two Korean peoples rather than on the consent of regional powers. Nevertheless, the international climate and the willingness of other states to provide Korea with economic assistance will influence the unification process.

#### **1. The United States: Economic and Political Facilitator**

According to the North Korean government, the major impediment to unification is the presence of American troops in South Korea. Most observers believe this objection is made primarily to mask North Korea's desire to remain divided until such time as it finds the opportunity to unite on its own terms, either through force or subversion. Nevertheless, the removal of US troops might draw North Korea into the unification process.

More to the point, without a continuing US force presence (or some substitute UN presence), a unified Korea might be hard-pressed to face two challenges. First, how to maintain law and order in the event of widespread activity of the former North Korean military. And second, how to provide for Korea's national security in its economically weakened state, for example if China were to lay claim to some portion of a unified Korea. The first scenario is far more plausible than the second. A second role for the United States, almost certainly required for a smooth unification, will be as a provider of economic assistance to a unified Korea in its first difficult years.

#### **2. China: Economic Partner or Political Spoiler**

If China continues on the road to a market economy, and if the Chinese Communist Party continues to loosen its control over society, China's primary role in a unified Korea will be economic. In the early stages of unification, Chinese economic assistance will be needed, as well as open borders for trade and investment. If, on the



other hand, the Party becomes stronger over the years, it may inspire the (North) Korean Workers' Party to hold out against unification, or once unified, to maintain a strong, destabilizing political presence. Finally, Chinese conflict in the region, for example over Taiwan, may destabilize the region and make a peaceful Korean unification more difficult by requiring increased military expenditures for all countries in the region and by providing a compelling reason for US troops to remain in Korea.

### **3. Japan: Non-Threatening Economic Partner**

Despite the insistence of the DPRK press that Japan is poised to re-invade the Korean peninsula, there is virtually no prospect that Japan will become a military threat to a unified Korea, although more intense economic competition may develop. As a country that imposed grievous injury on both Koreas during the colonial period, Japan will be obliged to provide significant economic assistance and investment. Economic conditions in Japan, as well as Japan's pre-unification relations with each of the Koreas, will influence how willing the Japanese people are to make retribution.

### **4. Russia: An Onlooker**

At the turn of the century, no one is counting on Russia to give a unified Korea either assistance or significant problems. A return of communism to Russia might inspire North Korean communists, but apart from that possibility Russia's role in Korean unification is likely to be minor.

## **D. Conclusions**

From the viewpoint of South Korea, the most controllable of these factors are the domestic Korean ones, and they are controllable only to the extent that sufficient planning takes place well before unification—for example, on political representation, treatment of former North Korean officials, economic matters, emigration, and land ownership. President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy would seem to be a workable approach to unification if it continues to be supported by the South Korean public.

Many of the North Korean factors, such as the attitude of the leadership, bureaucracy, masses and military, will depend largely on events as they unfold before unification, with ROK, DPRK, and international influences combining to set the stage for unification.

The international factors are largely beyond the control of a non-superpower state. Nonetheless, President Kim has shown the value of active diplomacy in gaining support

for his sunshine policy, and similar lobbying by ROK leaders in the years ahead may help shape the international environment in ways favorable to a unified Korea.

At the turn of the century, South Koreans remain too preoccupied with their own domestic problems to give sufficient thought to planning for unification. This is not so much a sign of fatalism as a consequence of limited institutional means to address such issues and limited resources to project the ROK's power beyond its borders. It is for this reason that continued US assistance in terms of political and economic support as well as advice and encouragement is likely to play an important facilitating role in creating a peaceful and stable environment in Northeast Asia during and after Korean unification.

**Appendix A**

**LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND FOCUS GROUPS**

## Appendix A

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND FOCUS GROUPS

The following individuals contributed to this study by sharing their experiences and ideas with me on a "not for attribution" basis. I interviewed many of these people extensively and spent time with members of focus groups. Interviews and meetings occurred in Tokyo and Seoul from October 10–19, 1999. I am grateful to all of them for their time and cooperation. Names are listed in alphabetical order, with the spelling and affiliation according to the individual's preference. Japanese and Korean names are spelled like American names: given name followed by surname.

Mrs. Myong Sue Chang	Publisher/President The Hanguk Ilbo & The Korea Times, ROK
General Seong Tae Cho	Minister of National Defense, ROK
Mr. Ha-Soo Hwang	Director-General Intra-Korean Interchange and Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Unification, ROK
Mrs. Keiko Imazato	Attorney at Law Taiju Law Office, Japan
Mr. Yoshikazu Imazato	Editorial Writer The Tokyo Shimbun and The Chunichi Shimbun, Japan
Dr. Hoon Jaung	Associate Professor Department of Political Science Chung Ang University, ROK
Mr. Kihong Jung	Assistant Director North America Division II, North American Affairs Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, ROK
Mr. Koichi Kato	Member of the Lower House and Member of the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan
Mr. Yutaka Kawashima	Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Dr. Byung-Kook Kim	Professor Department of Political Science Korea University, ROK
Mr. Hung-Ki Kim	Assistant Minister Policy Planning Ministry of Unification, ROK
Mr. Kwang-Dong Kim	Director-General International Economic Affairs Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK
Dr. Kyoung-Soo Kim	Senior Research Fellow Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, ROK
Dr. Woosang Kim	Professor Department of Political Science Sookmyung University, ROK
Dr. Doowon Lee	Assistant Professor Department of Economics Yonsei University, ROK
Mr. Kwan-Sei Lee	Chief Secretary to the Minister of Unification, ROK
Major General San-Hee Lee	Director-General Policy Planning Bureau Ministry of National Defense, ROK
Ambassador Dong-Won Lim	Minister of Unification, ROK
Mr. Akio Miyajima	Director of Oceania Division European and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Dr. Man-Kwon Nam	Senior Research Fellow Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, ROK
Mr. Kwan Yong Park	Vice President The Grand National Party and Member of the National Assembly, ROK
Dr. Yong-Ok Park	Deputy Minister Ministry of National Defense, ROK
Mr. Bon-Jo Rhee	Secretary to the President Kim Dae-Jung on National Unification The Blue House, ROK
Dr. Wookhee Shin	Assistant Professor Department of International Relations Seoul National University, ROK
Mr. Yasuhisa Shiozaki	Member of the House of Councilors, Japan

Mr. Min-Soon Song	Director-General North American Division II North American Affairs Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK
Dr. Seongjong Song	Assistant to the Deputy Minister of National Defense, ROK
Mr. Yoichi Toyoda	Political Correspondent <i>The Tokyo Shimbun</i> and <i>The Chunichi Simbun</i> , Japan
Mr. Yutaka Yokoi	Director Loan Aid Division Economic Cooperation Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Mr. Michael Zielenzieger	Bureau Chief Knight-Ridder Newspapers <i>San Jose Mercury News</i> , Japan

## Appendix B

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